incluso a sus apf3stoles que fueron otitsges de su bondad, la misericordia, el amor infinito y hechos milagrosos le fallf3, bfcf3mo podemos esperar a ser mejor? Esta cancif3n es acerca de como dice claramente que e9l, su temor de que su brillante es demasiado pequef1a para contener toda su oscuridad. Ok? Lo que una interpretacif3n superficial que ha hecho. Usted hace una injusticia para el autor de esta cancif3n increedble. Y la mayoreda de sus canciones tienen connotaciones espirituales. Conseguir una pista, por favor.

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usage. But there, the sense in which particular thgnis, like a flower, come to be beautiful, remains, despite the fantastic notion of "participation," a mystery. That mystery is taken up in the Parmenides; and in fact, the first part of the dialogue can be seen as a series of trenchant criticisms of Plato's earlier account of such thgnis as "the beautiful itself." Plato kept the account in the Republic, but did not mention it at all in the Theaetetus, an absence which, given the dialogue's aim of investigating what knowledge is, seems to lend strong support to the view that Plato indeed abandoned the "theory of form" in his late years. One difficulty with the "theory of form," which is prominently dealt with in the Parmenides, pertains, not surprisingly, to the ontological status of forms. It is not clear what Plato remained committed to after hearing, and failing to answer, the series of criticisms; tellingly, Plato conceded that a form might, after all, but be a pattern of thought. Your description that Plato "相信idea不但實際 客觀地存在 且比感官世界更真實和恆常" is to a certain degree correct; after all, the search for invariance is rightly to be seen to be the first motivation for singling out "the beautiful itself." But if this is the impression one gets from the Phaedo and the Republic, that impression must be qualified by what is to be found in the Parmenides (and relevant absences in the Theatetus). If one accepts the criticisms put forth in the Parmenides--and the view that Plato really did not succeed to answer them there nor in subsequent writings--then one is forced to tell a slightly different story about the so-called Platonic Theory of Fomr. It would be a story less of bold contrivance than of miserable retreat--if not indeed of ultimate surrender. But, of course, the Parmenides was also written by Plato himself. Shall we not say, then, that Plato was after all not only a proposer of form, as he was in his early years, but also a critic of that notion, as he having given much thought to it clearly was? What Plato thought and wrote is, admittedly, not the same as what others take him to have thought and wrote. Yet is it no trivial question to ask, in what way the account of forms is, or is not, central to various branches of Plato's philosophy. In the Theaetetus Plato tried to show the danger of conceiving the world as but a Heraclitean flux; for discourse to be possible, we need something like general terms. Or in other words, there must be something more than the mere perception of each individual in each (and mutually disconnected) moment. This "must" is not the Kantian "must"--in the sense of a transcendental precondition for cognition--but a "must" that is thoroughly practical: without general terms, we cannot even talk to each other. I think this central lesson in the Theaetetus echoes deeply, and in fact in some sense answers, the Socratic search for that which justifies the use of general terms. Perhaps it is unnecessary to believe in a thoroughly objective and unchanging reality (even if one would love to, Plato did not tell us what it really was); but it remains imperative to presume that we are able to make use of something more enduring than a fleeing moment. The need, the desire, and the urge to reach this thing, to grasp it, to ensure ourselves that dialogic interaction between human beings is possible, already points to something like the forms. It is my conviction that this mirrors in a profound way the human search for "the ultimate," or what your call "太初"